The brain constantly generates predictions about the environment to guide action. 2
Surprise is an elementary cognitive computation that the brain performs to guide 23 behavior. We investigated how the brain tracks surprise across different senses: Do unexpected 24 sounds make subsequent unexpected visual stimuli less surprising? Or does the brain maintain 25 separate expectations of environmental regularities for different senses? We found that the 26 latter is the case. However, even though surprise was separately tracked for auditory and visual 27 events, it elicited a common signature over frontal cortex in both sensory domains. Importantly, 28
we observed the same neural signature when actions had to be stopped after non-surprising 29 stop-signals in a motor inhibition task. This suggests that this signature reflects a rapid 30 interruption of ongoing behavior when our surroundings do not conform to our expectations. 31 provides an elementary cognitive and physiological process that forms the backbone of many 35 influential theories of cognitive processing and control (1-5). The rapid modification of ongoing 36 actions after surprise is critical for effective goal-directed behaviors (6, 7). For example, while 37 eating berries, one needs to rapidly stop ongoing actions when encountering a berry that looks, 38 smells, or feels surprising, lest one eats a rotten berry. However, the manner in which the brain 39 tracks surprise across different sensory domains is not fully understood. 40
Prior imaging work has shown that unexpected events, regardless of their sensory 41 modality, activate similar brain networks (8-11). In line with this, scalp-electroencephalography 42 (EEG) shows that unexpected events are followed by a modality-independent fronto-central P3 43 event-related potential (12, ERP, 13). The canonical neural response to surprise across modalities 44 could indicate that the brain integrates environmental information across modalities and 45 generates global predictions that form the basis of surprise-processing. Alternatively, surprise 46 might result from separate, independent predictions for each sensory domain. In this latter case, 47 the modality-independent surprise response could index a common set of downstream 48 mechanisms triggered by surprise, regardless of sensory domain. 49
In the current study, we tested these two alternatives against each other. While 50 performing a cross-modal oddball task (CMO, 14), human subjects were presented with visual or 51 auditory unexpected events. Using the statistics of the trial sequence, we constructed two 52 models of Bayesian surprise (5). In one model, surprise-values were separately coded for each 53 sensory domain (i.e., an unexpected sound did not reduce surprise of a subsequent unexpected 54 
Behavioral analysis 155
For the CMO task, we quantified mean reaction time (RT), mean error rate (wrong button 156 pressed), and mean miss rate (no response made within 1,000ms after target onset) for each of 157 the three trial types (standard cue, unexpected auditory cue, unexpected visual cue). We 158 analyzed these dependent variables using a 3 x 4 repeated-measures ANOVA with the factors 159 TRIAL TYPE (1-3) and BLOCK (1-4). In case of a significant interaction, we performed follow-up 160 paired-samples t-tests that compared each of the two unexpected cue conditions to the standard 161 cue condition separately for each of the four blocks, resulting in eight total tests. The alpha-level 162 for these comparisons was corrected using the Bonferroni correction to a corrected alpha 163 of .0063 (i.e., p = .05 / 8). 164
For the stop-signal task, we examined the following measures: mean Go-trial RT, mean 165 failed-stop trial RT, and mean stop-signal RT (SSRT; computed using the integration method, 166
Verbruggen & Logan, 2009; Boehler et al., 2014) . 167 168
EEG recording 169
EEG was recorded using a 62-channel electrode cap connected to two BrainVision MRplus 170 amplifiers (BrainProducts, Garching, Germany). Two additional electrodes were placed on the 171 left canthus (over the lateral part of the orbital bone of the left eye) and over the part of the 172 was placed at electrode Pz. EEG was digitized at a sampling rate of 500 Hz. 174 175
EEG preprocessing 176
The CMO and SST datasets were preprocessed separately, using custom routines in 177 MATLAB, incorporating functions from the EEGLAB toolbox (22). The channel * time-series 178 matrices for each task were imported into MATLAB and then filtered using symmetric two-way 179 least-squares finite impulse response filters (high-pass cutoff: .3 Hz, low-pass cutoff: 30 Hz). Non-180 stereotyped artifacts were automatically removed from further analysis using segment statistics 181 applied to consecutive one-second segments of data (joint probability and joint kurtosis, with 182 both cutoffs set to 5 SD, cf., 23). After removal of non-stereotypic artifacts, the data were then 183 re-referenced to common average and subjected to a temporal infomax ICA decomposition 184 algorithm (24), with extension to subgaussian sources (25). The resulting component matrix was 185 screened for components representing eye-movement and electrode artifacts using outlier 186 statistics and non-dipolar components (residual variance cutoff at 15%, 26), which were removed 187 from the data. The remaining components (an average of 17.1 per subject) were subjected to 188 further analyses. 189 (maximum surprise). Since this value is not defined on the first occurrence of an unexpected cue 201 (where the prior is zero, leading to a division by 0), the surprise value for that trial was set to 1 202
(maximum surprise). 203
Based on this equation, we generated two different models. In Model 1 (separate surprise 204 terms, Figure 2A ), values for each sensory domain were calculated separately. In other words, 205 the first time the subject encountered an unexpected auditory cue in the trial sequence, the 206 surprise for that trial was 1. Subsequent unexpected auditory cues then produced lower surprise 207 values as the posterior and prior probabilities of unexpected auditory cues converge on the same 208 value (i.e., as the ratio approaches 1, the log approaches 0) with increasing numbers of previous 209 unexpected auditory cues. Critically, these prior and posterior probabilities for auditory cues are 210 calculated without reference to the number of prior unexpected visual cues. Thus, once a subject 211 encounters the first unexpected visual cue, the surprise value for that trial is again 1 (maximum 212 surprise). Hence, the prior for each sensory domain is unaffected by the occurrence of 213 unexpected cues in the other sensory domain. unexpected cues for both sensory domains. To address this, we investigated an alternative formulation of Model 1 that respected this mutual exclusivity inherent in the experimental design. For example, upon realizing that the current trial contained an expected visual cue, this increases the prior probability for an unexpected auditory cue. It is not clear whether subjects could have reasonably learned this mutual exclusivity. Regardless of the formulation of Model 1, the first unexpected event for either modality is maximally surprising (as a result, this alternative formulation of Model 1 was nearly identical to the reported version, which assumed statistical independence). response on all trials that contained unexpected cues. This was done using procedures reported 227
by Fischer and Ullsperger (27) . For each subject, sixty-four matrices (one for each EEG channel) 228 were generated that contained the event-related EEG response for each individual trial with an 229 unexpected cue (24 auditory, 24 visual = 48), measured in 10 consecutive time windows covering 230 the entire cue-target interval (500ms, Figure 3 ). The time windows were centered around time 231 points ranging from 50 to 500ms and were 48ms long (24ms before and after the exact time 232 point). EEG activity within each time window was averaged for each trial (prior to averaging, the 233 single-trial data were baseline-corrected by subtracting the activity ranging from 100ms -0ms 234 relative to the cue). Hence, this resulted in a matrix of 48 (trials) * 10 (time points) for each 235 channel (unless trials were excluded because of artifacts); cf. the blue matrix in Figure 3 . Both of 236 the two candidate surprise models constructed from the Bayesian equation were then applied to 237 these EEG matrices. In applying the models, both the surprise terms and EEG response were z-238 scored (to standardize the resulting beta weights) and the model terms were regressed onto each 239 time-window vector of the trial by time window EEG response matrix. This was done using 240 MATLAB's robustfit() function, which performs a linear regression that is robust to outliers. 241
The resulting matrix of beta values was tested against 0 (using paired-samples t-tests for 242
the beta values, with subject as the random factor) at each channel and time point separately. 243
This identified channels and time periods at which the respective model surprise terms reliably 244 captured variability in the EEG signal. This resulted in two sets of 64 (channels) * 10 (time points) 245 = 640 individual tests (one set for each model). To test which model provided a superior fit of the 246 neural data at each channel and time-point, the resulting beta weights from each model also 247 tested against each other, producing a third set of 640 paired-samples t-test (again with subject 248 as the random factor). 249
To correct for multiple comparisons across these three sets of 640 t-tests, we adjusted 250 the alpha-level using the false discovery rate correction procedure (FDR, 28) based on a family-251 wise alpha-level of .01. This resulted in an adjusted alpha-level of p = .00044. A detailed graphical 252 illustration of this overall analysis strategy can be found in Figure 3 . 253 In addition to our above-described test of whether surprise is represented in the brain 274 separately for each sensory domain, we also tested whether the predicted fronto-central neural 275 response to unexpected cues (i.e., the P3) reflects an inhibitory control signal aimed at inhibiting 276 ongoing behavior during surprise. To this end, we employed cross-task comparisons between the 277 fronto-central P3 extracted for each subject from the CMO task and a separate 'functional 278 localizer' task -the stop-signal task -which all subjects performed after the CMO task (subjects 279 performed the SST after the CMO task so they were not biased to use inhibitory control in the 280 CMO task). We used two different approaches to compare activity across tasks: amplitude 281 correlations and indepdendent component analysis (ICA). 282 283
Amplitude correlations (Approach 1). 284
In the first approach, we assessed correlations between EEG amplitudes across tasks. 285
More specifically, if the fronto-central signals from each task reflect the same brain process, they 286 should be positively correlated (e.g., a subject with a more pronounced stop-signal P3 should also 287 show a larger P3 to unexpected cues in the CMO task). However, positive correlations might arise 288 from a variety of nuisance variables (e.g., better signal-to-noise ratio for some subjects compared 289 to others), and these alternatives were addressed by comparing these correlations with various 290 control correlations. 291
To perform our correlation analyses, for each subject, we extracted the amplitudes of 292 several trial-averaged event-related potentials (ERPs) from both tasks, all of which were averaged 293 from -100 to 700ms with respect to the time-locking event (and baseline corrected from -100 to 294 Control analysis 1: It is widely accepted that the occipital N1 is a visual perception process. 318
Hence, there should be a positive correlation between the posterior-occipital N1 to the go-signal 319 arrow in the SST task and the N1 to the target-arrow stimuli in the CMO task. Both stimuli were 320 visually identical and had the same meaning in both tasks (they instructed a motor response in 321 the according direction of the arrow). This control analysis was run to demonstrate that if two 322
ERPs reflect the same process across tasks, their amplitudes will be correlated. 323
Control analysis 2: The correlation between the stop-signal P3 and the occipital N1 to the 324 go-signa arrow l in the SST was examined to rule out the possibility that subjects show similar 325 amplitudes for ERPs within the same task, even when they reflect different processes. 326
Control analysis 3: The correlation between the stop-signal P3 in the SST and the occipital 327 N1 to the target-arrow in the CMO task was examined to rule out the possibility that subjects 328
show similar amplitudes for different ERPs regardless of task and / or process. 329
Control analysis 4: The correlation between the stop-signal P3 in the SST and the fronto-330 central P3 to standard cues in the CMO task was examined to rule out the possibility that the 331 stop-signal P3 is positively correlated with the fronto-central P3 to any meaningful task cue, even 332 when that cue is not surprising. 333 334 Correlation comparison. We predicted that our main hypothesis, as well as our control 335 analysis 1, would yield significant positive correlations. We also predicted that our other control 336 analyses (2-4) would not yield significant correlations. Hence, the latter control analyses involve 337 null hypothesis tests, with unknown statistical power. 338
Therefore, in addition to performing these control analyses, we directly compared the 339 magnitude of all control correlations against the magnitude of the correlations between the stop-340 signal P3 and the fronto-central P3s to unexpected cues in the CMO task. This tested the 341 alternative hypotheses that the predicted positive correlation would be significantly larger than 342 bootstrapping approach. First, we inverted the N1 amplitudes so that correlations between any 344 of the six amplitude measures (the four P3s and the two N1s) could be interpreted with the same 345 directionality. There were two correlations that were expected to be significant (the stop-signal 346 P3 versus the CMO P3 and the stop-signal N1 versus the CMO N1) and each of these were 347 compared with the three correlations that were expected to be null (control analyses 2-4 above), 348 resulting in six correlation differences. To test whether these differences were significant, we 349 repeated the same analysis 5000 times, but instead of assigning each data point to the 350 appropriate subject within each type of measure, the measures were randomly assigned to 351 subjects before the correlations were calculated. This generated an empirical null hypothesis 352 distribution of possible differences for each of the six pairs of correlations. A p-value for each 353 correlation difference was then generated by calculating the proportion of these empirical null 354 distribution values that were as large (or larger) than the difference that was found with the 355 actual (unscrambled) data. Each of these 6 correlation differences were deemed reliable if this 356 proportion was less than .05 (one-sided). 357 358 Partial correlations. Finally, an alternative to comparing correlations is to perform a 359 multiple regression analysis that includes the nuisance variables within the same model. 360
Therefore, we also fit linear models whose predictors included both the stop-signal P3 and each 361 one of the nuisance ERP amplitudes as predictors, with fronto-central P3 to unexpected cues in 362 the CMO task serving as the criterion variable. This produced a partial regression coefficient for 363 the hypothesized correlations between the stop-signal and surprise-related P3 amplitudes, with 364 the influence of the nuisance process (reflected in the control ERP amplitude) factored out. 365 366
Independent Component Analysis (Approach 2). 367
Our second, complementary approach to test whether the stop-signal P3 and the fronto-368 central P3 to unexpected cues reflect overlapping neural processes used ICA. 369
Overview. In all of the analyses above (for both Approach 1 to Hypothesis 2 and for the 370 analyses conducted to test Hypothesis 1), the SST and CMO task data were analyzed separately 371 to avoid any potential bias towards finding a relationship between them. In contrast, for this 372 analysis, the stop-signal and cross-modal oddball data were subjected to the same ICA. This 373 allowed us to reanalyze the surprise analyses under Hypothesis 1 with re-constructed data that 374 factored out the signal associated with the stop-signal P3. In this manner, we tested whether the 375 association between the surprise term and fronto-central EEG activity in the cross-modal oddball 376 task relies on the stop-signal IC (suggesting a commonality between processes, 19, 20, 29, 30), or 377 whether processes captured by other ICs explain the surprise-related response in the CMO task 378 (which would suggest that surprise-processing and action-stopping do not involve overlapping 379 processes). 380
First, we used the SST portion of the data as a functional localizer, extracting one (and 381 only one) independent component (IC) for each subject that best reflected the properties of the 382 fronto-central stop-signal P3. We then generated two different datasets for the CMO task for 383 each subject: one dataset in which the EEG channel data were reconstructed using only the one 384 IC that reflected the stop-signal P3, and one dataset in which the channel data were 385 reconstructed by back-projecting all ICs except the stop-signal P3 IC (thereby effectively removing 386 this IC's contribution from the channel data, similar to ICA-based eye-movement artifact 387 rejection). We then re-ran the single-trial modeling analyses performed under Hypothesis 1, 388 exactly as described above, separately on both datasets. 389
Stop-signal P3 IC selection. Automated selection of the stop-signal IC from the SST portion 390 of the merged data was done using a two-step spatiotemporal selection procedure (31). First, 391 each subject's component matrix was scanned for components that showed a fronto-centrally 392 distributed positivity on stop-compared to go-trials in the time window 250ms following the 393 respective signal. To this end, the scalp montage was divided into 9 ROIs (an anterior-posterior 394 dimension and a lateral dimension with 3 levels each). Components whose back-projected 395 channel-space topography for that difference wave showed a maximum in the fronto-central ROI 396
(consisting of electrodes FCz, Cz, FC1, FC2, C1, and C2) were selected. From all components that 397 matched this criterion, we then selected the one component whose average time-course across 398 that ROI showed the highest correlation to the original channel-space ERP in the same ROI and 399 time window (i.e., the ERP extracted from a back-projection of all non-artifact components). 400
Stop-signal P3 validation. We reconstructed the channel-space data for both tasks using 401 only the selected component, and tested for the following effects on the SST portion of that 402 dataset to validate that we had successfully selected the stop-signal P3 IC. accounted for by lower error rates on both types of unexpected-cue trials compared to the 459 standard-cue trials, which persisted throughout the task. 460
With regards to miss rates, there was no significant main effect or interaction (all p > .14). 461 While both models fit the data well at a similar cluster of fronto-central electrodes (which 480 is to be expected, considering that the surprise terms from each model are largely similar), direct 481 model comparisons showed that Model 1 (separate terms) fit the data significantly better than 482
Model 2 (common term). While Model 1 provided numerically better fits at all fronto-central 483 electrodes, the difference was statistically significant at p < .00044 in the 350ms time window at 484 electrodes Cz, FC2, C1, and C2 ( Figure 5C ). Figure 3 . 488 (highlighted in beige), both unexpected cues yield a P3 waveform, with the auditory condition 500 producing a noticeably larger deflection. 501
Figure 5. Results from the whole-brain single-trial model fitting analysis described in

Each topography depicts the averaged standardized beta coefficient at each channel in the 489 respective time window (x-axis) and model (plots A and B), as well as the M1-M2 model 490 comparison (plot C). White areas denote channels at which the fit within the depicted time-491 window was non-significant (p < .00044). In
Figure 6. Average channel event-related response to the three different cue types, plotted at the 503 channels in which the winning model (separate surprise terms; Model 1) provided significantly 504 better fit than the losing model (common surprise term). Beige highlighting denotes the time 505 window in which the winning model significantly fit the single-trial EEG response. This trial 506 average illustrates that the time window in which the fit was significant contains the fronto-507 central P3 ERP to both unexpected auditory and visual cues. 508 509
To illustrate that neither sensory domain accounted for the significant model fit on its 510 own, we also plotted the model fits separately for each trial type (rather than using one variable 511 to model both trials types as in the main analysis above). was not reliably correlated with the amplitude of the N1 to the Go-signal within the same task (r 553 = -.11, p = .41), demonstrating that individual differences failed to produce a spurious ERP 554 correlation within a task. Similarly, the stop-signal P3 amplitude was not reliably correlated with 555 the visual N1 to the arrow (target) within the cross-modal oddball task (r = .009, p = .95), 556 demonstrating that individual differences failed to produce a spurious ERP correlation across 557 tasks. Finally, stop-signal P3 amplitude was not reliably correlated with the fronto-central P3 558 amplitude to standard, non-surprising cues in the CMO task (r = .073, p = .6), demonstrating that 559 individual differences failed to produce a spurious ERP correlation for the same ERP component. 560
In addition to these significance tests on the correlations, our bootstrapping analysis 561 found that the positive correlations between the stop-signal P3 and the fronto-central P3s to 562 unexpected cues in the CMO task were significantly larger than all of the non-significant control 563
analyses. More specifically, the correlation between the stop-signal P3 and the fronto-central P3 564
to auditory cues was significantly larger than the stop-signal P3 to target-N1 correlation (p 565 = .0136), the stop-signal P3 to go-signal N1 correlation (p = .0482), and the stop-signal P3 to 566 standard-cue P3 correlation (p = .0348). The corresponding p-values for the correlation between 567 the stop-signal P3 and the fronto-central P3 to unexpected visual cues, as compared to the three 568 control correlations were .0144, .0468, and .0373. 569
Finally, the partial correlation analyses confirmed that the positive correlation between 570 the stop-signal P3 and the fronto-central P3 to unexpected cues in the CMO task could not be 571 accounted for by the amplitude of any of the control ERPs. For unexpected visual cues, the 572 correlation between the fronto-central P3 and the stop-signal P3 was still significant when the 573 model partialed out the Go-signal N1 (partial model fit: t(52) = 2.69, p = .0095), the N1 to the 574 target/arrow in the CMO task (t(52) = 2.7, p = .0094), and the fronto-central P3 to standard cues 575 in the CMO task (t(52) = 3.47, p = .001). The same was true for the correlations between the stop-576 signal P3 and the fronto-central P3 to unexpected auditory cues (Go-signal N1 partialed out: t(52) 577 = 2.69, p = .0097; N1 to the arrow/target in the CMO task partialed out: t(52) = 2.83, p = .0067; 578 fronto-central P3 to standard cues partialed out: t(52) = 2.7, p = .0094). The results from Approach 1 to Hypothesis 2 suggest that action-stopping and surprise-596 processing involve overlapping neural processes. Providing converging support for this 597 conclusion, we used ICA to investigate whether the trial-by-trial relationship between the 598
Bayesian model surprise terms and the fronto-central activity found in the CMO task was 599 accounted for by the independent component that reflected the stop-signal P3. 600
We first checked whether the IC that was algorithmically selected to reflect the stop-601 signal P3 showed the predicted functional properties in the SST (Figure 9) . Indeed, the onset of 602 the P3 extracted from that IC occurred significantly earlier on successful stop-trials compared to 603 
SSRT across subjects (right plot). 618 619
We then repeated our model-fitting analysis (Hypothesis 1) of the CMO task portion of 620 the combined EEG data, when that data was reconstructed using only the selected stop-signal P3 621 IC for each subject. We found that the winning model from Hypothesis 1 (separate surprise terms) 622 retained its significantly positive fit with fronto-central electrodes (significant positive 623 correlations found in the 300ms time window at electrodes Fz, Cz, FCz, FC1, FC2, CP2, F1, F2, C1, 624 C2, FC4, and C4 and in the 350ms time window at electrodes C4 and F1) when the EEG signal was 625 solely reproduced by back-projecting the stop-signal P3 into channel-space. In other words, the 626 same independent component that indexes successful motor inhibition in the stop-signal task 627
showed the same positive association with the surprise term in the CMO task that was reported 628 for the full channel-space reconstruction (based on all ICs) in Hypothesis 1 ( Figure 10A) . 629
In contrast, the remainder of the signal (i.e., the portion of the CMO task EEG data that 630 was reconstructed based on all independent components that were left over after the stop-signal 631 P3 independent component was removed) did not show a significant positive association with 632 the surprise term ( Figure 10B) . In the current study, we tested two hypotheses about the nature of surprise processing 650 in human frontal cortex. First, we found that fronto-central event-related activity at roughly 275-651 375ms following the appearance of unexpected cues tracks surprise for each sensory domain 652 separately. Rather than incorporating surprise into a common cross-modal term, the neural 653 response was better characterized by a model in which surprise was tracked for each domain 654
separately. The time range and topographical extent of this activity overlaps with the well-655 characterized P3 trial-average ERP, which is in line with classic averaging-based ERP studies of 656 surprise (1, 12, 32). Our single-trial approach was able to disentangle two competing explanations 657 for the common activity found for unexpected events across sensory domains, thereby providing 658 novel insights into how frontal cortex constructs and updates models of the multi-sensory 659 environment. 660
We then tested whether the modality-independent fronto-central neural activity during 661 surprise indexes a rapid inhibition of ongoing motor activity -i.e., whether the convergence 662 between neural signals following unexpected events, regardless of sensory domain, can be 663 explained by a common control mechanism that is downstream from surprise. This hypothesis is 664 relatively new (15, 33-35), as most previous studies of surprise focused on its cognitive effects 665 (12, 14, 36, 37). The comparatively large sample size of our study allowed us to take the novel 666 approach of correlating electrophysiological signal amplitudes across different tasks, revealing 667 that the P3 amplitude following stop-signals in the stop-signal task reliably correlated with the 668 fronto-central P3 found during multi-modal surprise. Our control analyses indicated that this 669 correlation reflects a common process rather nuisance variables (such as non-specific 670 correlations of ERP amplitudes within or across tasks). Moreover, both ERPs reflected the same 671 component when submitted to a joint independent components analysis. 672
We conclude that the same process that is underlying the stop-signal P3 is also active 673 during cross-modal surprise. However, what is that process? The most parsimonious explanation 674 is that this signal reflects cognitive control within frontal cortex aimed at inhibiting ongoing motor 675 activity. In the case of stop-signals, this stops the planned motor action, whereas in response to 676 surprise, it produces a 'pause', which purchases time for the cognitive system to update the 677 model of the environment without continuing an action that may have been rendered 678 inappropriate by the unexpected change in environmental demand. This pause can also be 679 observed in the reaction time times to the subsequent target. Alternatively, the common process 680 might reflect model updating or surprise (as operationalized in the CMO). However, in the SST, 681 stop-signals are explicitly part of the task (and are introduced during pre-task practice). In other 682 words, participants are expecting and planning for stop-signals, and their occurrence should not 683 produce surprise. Indeed, if stop-signals were surprising, one would expect the amplitude of the 684 stop-signal P3 to decrease as the task progressed (i.e., as the priors become stable and the 685 surprise terms become smaller and smaller, which is what occurred for the fronto-central P3 in 686 the CMO task). However, as the auxiliary plot in Figure 11 shows, the amplitude of the stop-signal 687 P3, unlike the P3 to unexpected cues in the CMO task, remained constant throughout the 688 supported by recent studies, which found that unexpected perceptual events lead to a broad, 697 reactive suppression of the motor system, as measured using transcranial magnetic stimulation 698 (35, 38). Additionally, measurements of isometrically exerted force have shown that unexpected 699 events lead to a rapid, reactive reduction of such steadily exerted motor activity (34). 700
Furthermore, unexpected events have been found to interrupt ongoing finger-tapping (39). 701
Finally, studies using optogenetics have shown that when regions of the subcortical network that 702 cause inhibition of motor activity are experimentally inactivated, unexpected events no longer 703 to its prominent cognitive effects, also lead to interruption of ongoing motor activity. 705
The interpretation that the common process between the stop-signal and CMO tasks is 706 motor control is also supported by some features of our data. Specifically, our behavioral data 707 indicated an incidental slowing of reaction times to the target in the CMO task when that target 708 was preceded by unexpected cues, which is in line with prior behavioral studies (41-43). Our 709 exploratory analysis showed that during the task period in which this RT effect was present, the 710 surprise model (specifically, the separate-term model that also provided the best fit to the neural 711 data) was positively related to the RT data: trials with more surprising cues, according to the 712 Bayesian model, yielded longer reaction times to the subsequent target. We propose that this 713 extra time reflects a momentary suppression of the motor system produced by the unexpected 714 event. Supporting this claim that this 'pause' is an adaptive process, accuracy was also increased 715 following unexpected cues (i.e., a speed-accuracy tradeoff was enacted after unexpected cues, 716 which may be enabled by the transient pause in the motor system that we purport to be reflected 717 in the fronto-central P3). In that vein, one notable observation is that while the surprise term fit 718 the neural data for both domains to similar degrees (Figure 7) , the trial-average response to 719 unexpected auditory cues in our current study appeared to be larger in amplitude compared to 720 unexpected visual cues (Figure 6 ). Interestingly, the reverse was the case in the reaction time 721 pattern, where visual unexpected cues seemed to have larger effects (Figure 4 ). While we are 722 hesitant to make strong conclusions based on the trial-average data, it is notable that the timing 723 of the P3 to the different stimuli also differs in latency, which likely reflects the fact that early 724 auditory processing is faster than visual processing (44). Since the increase in trial-averaged P3 725 possible to untangle surprise and model updating by introducing different degrees of volatility 749 into the environment (49) or by explicitly instructing participants that certain surprising cues 750
should not be used to update the internal model of the task (45). However, in studies like the 751 current one, the two terms are largely identical, with the exception being trials in which in an 752 unexpected cue follows a prolonged sequence of expected cues. (Such trials introduce non-753 monotonous upticks in the Shannon surprise term, whereas the Bayesian surprise / model 754 updating term is always monotonically decreasing). Perhaps most relevant is the question which 755 term better reflects the commonplace meaning of 'surprise' in the everyday world, outside of 756 the laboratory, and which term better reflects the participants' approach to the experiment. If 757 subjects place strong emphasis on the recent trial sequence and dynamically adapt to the 758 changing local probabilities of unexpected cues, then the Shannon term may provide a better 759 characterization of surprise. This would be the case if participants assume that the current 760 environment constantly changes (i.e., high volatility). However, if subjects approach the 761 experimental task as a specific, unchanging environment that they need to adapt to by learning 762 the base rates of occurrence, then the Bayesian surprise term may provide a better 763 characterization of surprise. In the current study we assumed that the latter is the case (indeed, 764 the experimental design involved a stable procedure for each task), and as such, 'surprise' and 765 'model updating' are essentially synonymous in our study. 766
Taken together, our study suggests that when an environmental model is updated 767 because of an unexpected cue, this leads to surprise, which is accompanied by inhibitory control 768 of the motor system. From a real-world perspective, it makes sense for the cognitive apparatus 769 to operate this way. Because we interact with the environment by executing motor commands, 770
it is important that we interrupt ongoing motor behavior while the model of the environment is 771 updated; ongoing actions need to be re-evaluated in light of changing environmental 772 contingencies. We hypothesize that motor inhibition prevents the execution of actions that were 773 appropriate under the old, now outdated model, and may also free up resources to rapidly 774 initiate appropriate new actions. This interpretation of the medial frontal cortex is in line with 775 prior findings regarding its role in the control of behavior (2, 50, 51). Here, we propose a specific 776 neural mechanism by which such control of behavior is achieved during surprise. 777
In conclusion, we found that surprise-based model updating in frontal cortex occurs 778 separately for each sensory domain, but shares a supra-model control mechanism that likely 779 involves the inhibitory control of behavior. These results suggest a specific control mechanism 780 that is rapidly deployed when the model of the environment unexpectedly changes. 781
